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~LANI~ PAGE

QUESTION PRESENTED
The court of appeals concluded that a reasonable
jury could find that actions by supervisors at the Idaho
Department of Corrections created a hostile work environment. Petitioner does not seek review of that
holding. The question presented is:
Did the court of appeals err in concluding that
the record contained sufficient evidence to
permit a reasonable jury to infer that the actions of those supervisors were gender-based?
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INTRODUCTION
The petition rests on a single, straightforward, essential, and clearly faulty premise - that the Ninth
Circuit held that a hostile work environment claim
does not require proof of a discriminatory motive. The
decision below contains no such holding. To the contrary, that court of appeals recognizes that proof of
gender-based discrimination is indeed required; the
opinion contains a section expressly devoted to assessing the evidence supporting plaintiff’s claim
that gender-based discrimination created the hostile
work environment. More than 40 other Ninth Circuit
decisions recognize that requirement in hostile environment cases. The dissent rests primarily on a disagreement about whether the plaintiff offered enough
evidence to permit a reasonable jury to infer the existence of such unlawful discrimination. A disagreement
about whether a correctly stated rule of law was
properly applied by the court below, particularly when
it turns on a dispute about the probative value of evidence, does not warrant review by this Court.

STATEMENT
A. Legal Background
This case involves a routine application of the legal standards governing claims that discriminatory
conduct created a hostile work environment. Those
claims have arisen most often when the conduct complained of is sexual harassment. E.g., Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-68 (1986). The decisions
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of this Court make clear that the same legal standards
apply to any discriminatory conduct that creates a hostile work environment. In this Court, the litigation in
which hostile environment claims have been considered have largely arisen under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.42 U.S.C. § 2000-e. The lower court~,~
have consistently assumed that the legal standard re-garding what constitutes a hostile environment under
Title VII would apply to a hostile environment claim
under the Equal Protection Clause.1
There are three distinct elements of a hostile work
environment claim. First, the environment must be objectively hostile; the conduct complained of must be
"severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment - an environment
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive .... "Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993). Second, the environment must be subjectively
regarded by the plaintiff as hostile; "the victim .o.
[must] subjectively perceive[] the environment to be
[hostile or] abusive." Id. Third, the underlying conduct that created that hostile environment must have
been the result of any unlawful discrimination. Thus,
where a plaintiff alleges that because of her gender she
faced a hostile work environment, "the plaintiff.., must
... prove that the conduct at issue ... actually constituted ’discrimina[tion] ... because of ... sex.’" Oncale v.
~ Jackson v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections, 643 Fed.Appx.
889, 891 (11th Cir. 2016); Fields v. Stephen F. Austin State University, 611 Fed.Appx. 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2015); Davis v. California
Dept. of Corrections, etc., 484 Fed.Appx. 124, 126 (9th Cir. 2012).
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Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81
(1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)) (emphasis in
original).
B. Factual Background
Prior to the fall of 2011, Cynthia Fuller was a probation ofricer in the Caldwel] office of the Idaho Department of Corrections ("IDOC"). In the spring of that
year she became involved in a romantic, physically intimate relationship with another employee in that ofrice, Herbt Cruz.
On August 15, 2011, the director of the Caldwell
office, Kim Harvey, announced that Cruz had been
temporarily placed on paid administrative leave while
an unexplained investigation occurred. Neither Fuller
nor anyone else in the office was told at the time what
this was about. Harvey commented at a meeting that
"[h]opefully this gets cleared up quickly and he can
come back to work,"2 suggesting that Harvey regarded
the issue that had led to the administrative leave as
minor, baseless, or both.
Within a week, Fuller learned that Cruz had been
placed on paid administrative leave because a woman
had alleged that Cruz had raped her. That realization
cast a pall over Fuller’s relationship with Cruz. It also
raised troubling questions about why Harvey had expressed his "hope[]" that Cruz would be quickly

~ Doc. 45-4, p. 33; Doc. 44-9, p. 30.
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exonerated, rather than a desire that the matter be
fully and accurately investigated, and about why Hatvey would refer an accusation of rape, a serious felony
under state law, as something to be "cleared up
quickly," as if a rape allegation would probably prove
to be just some sort of misunderstanding.
On August 22, Fuller met with Cruz and gave him
a letter indicating that she wanted to end their rela-tionship.3 Cruz reacted by forcibly raping Fuller. App..
4. As is often true in abusive relationships, Fuller was
not able to immediately end her involvement with
Cruz. The two intermittently reconciled, until Fuller
finally cut off contact with Cruz twelve days later. During that interim period Cruz raped Fuller twice more,
on August 30 or 31 and again on September 3. Id.
Fuller took pictures of the injuries she had sustained when she was raped on August 22, because she
was afraid for her safety. She gave a copy of those photographs to a friend, who thereafter gave the pictures
to the detective in the Sheriff’s office who was investigating the initial rape allegation. The friend identified
Fuller as the victim, and explained to the detective
that Cruz had caused the injuries visible in the picture.~ On September 6, apparently while at work,
Fuller telephoned the detective, reported that she too
had been raped by Cruz, and offered to help in the investigation that was already ongoing regarding Cruz.
The detective, who knew Fuller’s supervisor Kim
3 Doc. 45-4, p. 24.
4 Doc. 45-4, p. 26; Doc. 48-3, p. 14.
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Harvey, asked Fuller to go to Harvey and have Harvey
bring her to the Sheriff’s office.5
At the Sheriff’s office, Fuller gave the detective a
detailed account of the three times Cruz had raped her.
Harvey was present for part of the interview. After
Fuller had finished her meeting with the detective,
Harvey made a startling admission. Harvey told Fuller
"that Cruz had a history of this kind of behavior and
that he knew of several instances." App. 42 Harvey did
not explain why, if he (and perhaps others at IDOC)
knew about a history of abuse by Cruz, they had failed
to do anything about it. The reason for that inaction
remains in dispute. See App. 13 n.8, 19-20, 31-33. At
this point Fuller was understandably terrified of Cruz.
Harvey searched her home before she would enter it to
retrieve some personal belongings, and then took her
to the home of a friend where (she hoped) Cruz could
not find her.7
On September 7, with the encouragement of a rape
counselor in the Sheriff’s office, Fuller applied for a
civil protection order against Cruz. Harvey was in the
courtroom during at least part of the proceeding, at
~ Doc. 45-4, pp. 40-41. Harvey gave a conflicting account of
what led to his decision to go to the Sheriff’s office with Fuller.
Doc. 44-9, pp. 27, 32-33. The dissenting judge below credited Harvey’s account. App. 30-31.
6 The dissenting judge below describes Harvey as having
mentioned "that there had been prior accusations of misconduct
against Cruz." App. 31. But Harvey described a history of "this
kind of behavior," not this kind of"accusation[ ]."
7 Doc. 44-9, p, 35.
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which Fuller would have been called upon to demonstrate to the judge that Cruz posed a danger to her.
Under Idaho law, a civil protection order can be issued
only if the judge finds "there is an immediate and present danger of domestic violence to the petitioner...."
I.C. § 39-6306(1). The state judge signed the civil protection order on September 7, and Fuller telephoned
Harvey and notified him of that order.8
Late on the afternoon of September 7, despite
knowing the details of Fuller’s interview, and despite
having been present at the court hearing on the civil
protection order and knowing of the state judge’s ac-.
tion, Harvey sent an email to the staff at the Caldwel].
office that encouraged the staff to provide Cruz with
moral support.
Just an update on Cruz. I talked to him. He
sounds rather down, as to be expected .... Just
as a reminder - and this is always one thing I
hate about these things - he cannot come to
the office until the investigation is complete.
Nor can he talk to anyone in the Department
about the investigation. So, if you want to talk
to him, give him some encouragement etc.,
please feel free.
App. 5. Far from indicating that there was any particular importance to keeping Cruz out of the office where
Fuller worked, Harvey minimized the significance of
what was apparently a routine element of a temporary
administrative leave, indicating that he "hate[d]" the
s Doc. 80-2, p. 2.

exclusion from the office that he (but not the staff)
knew was essential for Fuller’s safety.
Beginning on September 6, Fuller went on leave to
recover from the rapes.9 Harvey initially told her that
she could be on paid administrative leave, but subsequently IDOC declined to grant her paid administrative leave. Fuller’s only option was to use her
accumulated sick leave and vacation time, which
lasted about a month. "Harvey told Fuller’s direct supervisors ... that she was taking leave and that, if other
employees inquired about her absence, the agency
should say that it was related to her known illness."
App. 5. Fuller moved to a new home, where she hoped
Cruz could not find her. Cruz somehow learned of her
location, and in violation of the civil protection order
rode past her new home on a bicycle. Fuller had the
protection order amended to expressly prohibit Cruz
from coming near her new home.1° The state court extended the protection order on September 15, October
5, and November 4.11
In mid-September IDOC began its own investigation into the rape allegations, which proceeded independently of the criminal investigation being
conducted by the county Sheriff’s Office. On September 15, Fuller was interviewed by an IDOC investigatot.12 Fuller was "instructed not to talk about [her
9 Doc. 47-24, p. 3.
lo Doc. 45-4, pp. 47, 55.
11 Doc. 48-7.
12 Doc. 48-3, p. 21.
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allegations against Cruz] .-13 On September 16, Harvey
sent an email to Henry Atencio, Deputy Chief of Probation and Parole, advising him that Fuller was upset,
nervous and "afraid of [Cruz] .-14
When her sick leave and vacation time ran out,
Fuller (a single mother) had no choice but to return to
work. IDOC supervisors had never explained to the ofrice staff what Cruz was being investigated for, and
had not corrected the inaccurate, and increasingly im.plausible, story that Fuller was absent because of a
pre-existing medical problem. As a result, the staff
Fuller’s office were convinced that she had feigned ill-.
ness just to get out of work, and when she returned she
was shunned by virtually everyone except her supervisor. "Staff, unaware of why she had been absent from
work, suspected that she was ’faking being sick.’" App.
7. Because Fuller had been instructed not to disclose
her allegations against Cruz, she could not explain
why she had been absent, or what was going on. As she
told her supervisors, "when I get here, the only people
that talk to me are the supervisors. None of the staff
will talk to me .... [T]he staff are pissed that I’m even
setting foot in here because I shouldn’t even have a job
because I’m faking being sick .... -15 "[The staff] will
come in the office. They will turn their back to me. They
will not even acknowledge my existence. I can say hi to
~3 Doc. 44-1, p. 29. The record does not reveal when that instruction was given.
14 Doc. 47-21, p. 3.
~5 Doc. 44-1, pp. 11-13.
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somebody in the hallway. They will just keep - won’t
even make eye contact.’’1~
When Fuller returned to work, she gave a copy of
the civil protection order to Harvey. Harvey, however,
said nothing about it to the staff, which still had no
idea why Cruz was on leave. After seven weeks had
passed since her interview by IDOC investigators,
without any action by IDOC or any explanation to the
staff, Fuller wrote to Atencio on November 6 expressing fears for her safety. "I was sodomized by force by an
IDOC employee, which has left me in a completely fearful and broken state which has caused me to change
my residence, [and] has impaired my ability to live normal, sleep normal, or feel safe!"17 In her letter, Fuller
quoted the state Policy on Domestic Abuse of state employees, which provides that an employee’s allegation
of abuse should not be kept confidential where "there
is a threat to the safety of the individual or other eraployees in the work place.’’is She pointed out that
IDOC supervisors "ha[d] been present in the courthouse on each day that the hearings for the protection
order are extended, and are full[y] aware that there’s
an order in place,"~9 yet the staff had not been told
what was really going on. Under state policy, Fuller objected, "confidentiality should be compromised where
there’s a threat to safety. My worry, is that the
16 Doc. 44-1, p. 32.
17 Doc. 47-34, p. 3.
is Id., p. 4.
19 ~Clo
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Department has put another potential victim in place
for the predator, Mr. Cruz to prey on, due to disinformation."20
On November 10, Fuller met with Harvey and[
Atencio. By this point "the severity of the sexual as-.
saults on Fuller documented by the photographs [had.
been] seen by the IDOC supervisors .... "App. 14. Fuller
objected that she was being ostracized by virtually the
entire staff because Harvey and Atencio had withheld
key information from the staff about the situation.
"[A]ll the staff has been misled and told I wasn’t here
... because I was sick and now none of them will talk to
me because they think I shouldn’t even have a job ....
[T]he reason why the staff won’t talk to me is because
they’ve been misled. They were lied to.’’21 Fuller reminded Harvey and Atencio that she could not explain
to the staff what was going on because she had been
instructed not to discuss her allegations. "I was instructed not to talk about it. It’s made an impossible
situation for me in a lot of areas because I can’t talk
about it .... ,22
Fuller expressed concern for her own safety, and
urged Harvey and Atencio to tell the staff about the
civil protection order. "Fuller asked that the IDOC inform [the Caldwell office] employees of the civil protection order, explaining that she did not ’feel safe’
because Cruz could walk in to the building and no one
20 Id.
21 Doc. 44-1, pp. 11-13.
22 Id., p. 29.
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would call the police." App. 8. She told Harvey and
Atencio that revealing the existence and terms of the
civil protection order would
make it easier for staff to understand [that I
was not] faking being sick like they all
think .... And another reason I think they
should know is that it would make it safer.
Right now,.., he can walk right in the door and
I think about that every day I come to work.
My office is the very first office that he would
come to. Nobody would think to call the police
or anything.23
"I think that not only will it make me feel safer, it’s the
right thing to do because the judge granted the protection order and [the] address [of the IDOC office] is
listed on it. The staff here have a right to know that
[about] someone that they may still be friend[s] with,
and [might] let [him] just walk right in the door.’’24
Atencio objected that"[it] wouldn’t be ... in my purview to announce [the civil protection order] to staff.’’25
"[A]s much as you find this distasteful, Cruz is still our
employee. And we have to be conscious of his rights."
App. 8. Responding to Fuller’s fears for her safety, Harvey explained that the disclosure she was requesting
would not be fair to Cruz. "Harvey explained that he
was ’not at liberty to say why [Cruz is on leave] because
that wouldn’t be fair ... if the allegations were proven
2~ Id., pp. 30-31.
24 Id., p. 24.
25 Doc. 44-1, p. 23.
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untrue,’ and Cruz would have a ’stigma hanging over
[him].’" App. 7. Harvey expressed concern that "[o]bvi-ously if we tell [the staff] that he’s not allowed within.
a thousand feet of the property, there is going to be a
number of questions that come up.’’26
In her November 6 letter, Fuller had objected to
Harvey’s statement in mid-August that he "hopes
[Cruz] returns soon.’’27 Harvey justified that statement
by explaining that when he had made the statement in
August, only one woman had accused Cruz of rape.
"Harvey said that at the time he told staff that he
looked forward to Cruz’s prompt return to work, ’the
only alleged victim that [he] knew about was the gal ...
that had originally come forward,’ not Fuller." App. 7.
"Fuller said Harvey’s later encouragement of staff to
give Cruz ’moral support,’ despite knowing that she
had accused him of rape, was ’completely insulting.’
Harvey replied that he was ’trying to keep [her] out of
it.’" App. 8. "Atencio said she did not meet the ... criteria [for paid administrative leave], because her situation was not ’unusual.’" App. 7.
On November 15, Fuller sent an email to Atencio
and Harvey, again expressing her fears for her safety,
and asking that the staff be told of the civil protection
order. If the staff were not told about the order, she indicated "I am unable to return to work due to it being

28 Id. p. 23.
27 Doc. 47-34, p. 4.
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unsafe .... ,,2s Atencio still refused to tell the Caldwell office staff about the civil protection order. In a letter
drafted at this time (but not mailed because of Fuller’s
resignation), Atencio explained that he had decided not
to disclose to the staff the existence of the civil protection order because the order had been entered "a civil
matter."29
On November 16, Harvey sent the staff an email
(drafted by Atencio), essentially reiterating his September statement that Cruz (like any employee placed
on administrative leave during an investigation) could
not come into the office.
I want to update you regarding Herbt Cruz.
As you know, Herbt is on leave pending an investigation. The investigation is on-going and
we hope to bring this to a resolution as soon
as possible. As the investigation is currently
underway, Cruz is not allowed in the D-3 ofrices. If you see him, please contact a supervisor.
App. 8. The email, subsequent events would reveal,
was in two material respects inaccurate. First, the
investigation was not "currently underway." The
2s Doc. 47-37 ("I am inquiring as to whether it has been disclosed that a civil protection order is in place protecting me from
Mr. Cruz. And proper instruction as to what staff should do if the
individual enters the premises. If not I am unable to return to
work due to it being unsafe, which creates a hostile working environment. Please advise.").
29 Doc. 47-28 ("I do not believe it is prudent for the department to discuss this protection order with staff as this is a civil
matter.").
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investigation had actually ended more than two weeks
earlier, when the IDOC investigator submitted his re-.
port on October 28.30 Second, the supervisors who had
seen the report did not intend to resolve the matter "as
soon as possible." Atencio and Harvey took no action
against Cruz for two full months after the end of the
investigation, finally acting only after IDOC was notified that Fuller had filed a Title VII charge with the
EEOC.
The November 16 email was for several reasons
palpably inadequate to protect Fuller. None of the staff
were told that Cruz posed a potential threat to Fuller
if, for example, Cruz asked where Fuller was or attempted to go to her office. Because the staff did not
know about the protection order, they would not know
that they should call the police if Cruz came into the
office, or that under federal law it was unlawful for
Cruz to possess a firearm. The advice to call a supervisor could have been understood to suggest the staff
themselves should do nothing, and the "please" implied
there was nothing at all urgent about the situation. Of
the supervisors in the Caldwell office, only two knew
about the protection order, and only Harvey had seen
it. If a staff member contacted one of the other supervisors, that supervisor would have had no idea that
Cruz was under a court order that precluded him from
coming into the office, or that he might pose a threat
to Fuller.

30 Doc. 48-3, p. 34.
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Fuller resigned shortly after receiving the email.
Her resignation explained that she was doing so because IDOC officials were unwilling to protect her from
Cruz.

Due to non compliance by the Department of
Correction, with... [the state Policy on Domestic Violence],... and due to Mr. Atencio’s desire
to protect Officer Herbrt Cruz as specified by
Mr. Atencio, in our November 10th meeting, ...
It]he work environment for me is hostile and
unsafe .... Not only am I at risk to be raped
again by kidnap and sodomy, but the staffers
at Caldwell Probation and Parole, are also,
very much at risk .... I resign from the Department of Correction, as the work environment
is ... hostile [and] unsafe ....
Fuller specifically objected to the unwillingness of
Atencio and Harvey "to notify staffers of the details of
my disclosure which alleges that Herbrt Cruz has kidnapped and raped me by sodomy, which is consistent
with the information [obtained] by detectives .... "or "to
notify staffers ... that Herbrt Cruz is not permitted
within 1000 feet of [the Caldwell office] ... and the instruction for calling 911 or local law enforcement in the
event the order is violated by Herbrt Cruz, as specified
in the Civil Protection Order...."32
On December 6, 2011, Fuller filed a Title VII
charge with the EEOC and the Idaho Human Rights
Commission, which promptly notified IDOC. On
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December 27, 2011, shortly after receiving notice of the
Title VII charge, IDOC sent Cruz a Notice of Contemplated Action, signed by Harvey, announcing that it intended to initiate administrative proceedings to
dismiss him. Cruz resigned on January 9, 2012.33
The Notice of Contemplated Action summarized
the statements of Fuller and the other woman who asserted she had been raped by Cruz, but did not indicate
whether IDOC credited those statements. Several
years later, in the course of discovery, the IDOC Director testified that he would consider rehiring Cruz to
work for the Department.34 The Director and Atencio
stated, however, that they would not rehire Fuller, because her response to the events of 2011 had been too
"emotional."35
C. Proceedings Below
Fuller commenced this action in federal court, alleging a number of federal and state claims. Plaintiff
raised three distinct discrimination claims relevant
here26 First, she asserted that the discriminatory
manner in which her supervisors had responded to the
33 Doc. 47-45, p. 2.
34 Doc. 44-12, p. 29.
~5 Doc. 44-3, p. 47.
3~ Plaintiff also alleged that the rapes themselves created a
hostile work environment, independent of the reaction of the
IDOC supervisors. Both lower courts rejected that claim on the
ground that attacks outside of the workplace could not, without
more, create an actionable hostile work environment. App. 53-54,
63-70.
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rapes had created a hostile work environment. Second,
she asserted that the gender-based refusal of the supervisors to disclose the civil protection order had resulted in a constructive discharge. Third, she claimed
that the supervisors had refused to grant her paid administrative leave because of her sex. The complaint
asserted these claims both against the IDOC and
against several individual supervisors27 The claim
against the IDOC was based on Title VII, which provides a private cause of action against employers, but
not against individuals. The claim against the supervisors was based on the Equal Protection Clause, relying
on the private cause of action established by section
1983.42 U.S.C. § 1983. The private cause of action provided by section 1983 is available against individuals,
but not against states. The remedies available in a section 1983 action are potentially more generous than
those provided by Title VII.
The defendants moved for summary judgment on
grounds distinct to each of the three claims. With regard to the hostile work environment claim, the defendants argued only that the actions complained of
did not create an objectively hostile work environment.
With regard to the denial of paid administrative leave,
the defendants argued that the decision was not motivated by the plaintiff’s gender. As to the constructive
discharge claim, the defendants argued both that the
refusal to disclose the civil protection order was not the
37 The district court states only that the supervisors were
sued in their official capacities. App. 58. Atencio was also sued in
his personal capacity. Doc. 1.
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result of gender discrimination, and that the result of
that refusal was not so severe as to support a claim of
constructive discharge.3s
The district court granted summary judgment on
all claims. The trial court concluded that the environment that Fuller faced was not sufficiently adverse to
constitute a hostile work environment; the court did
not address whether the actions that had created that
environment were the result of gender bias. App. 6370. The court granted summary judgment on the constructive discharge claim solely on the ground that the
conditions that Fuller faced were not so extreme as to
justify her resignation, and did not address the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that the supervisor’s
refusal to disclose the civil protection order was the result of gender bias. App. 70-72. The court held that
there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that
the denial of administrative leave was the result of discrimination. App. 73-77. The district court first addressed these issues under Title VII (App. 63-77), and
then held that "the same reasons" required dismissal
of the Equal Protection claims. App. 78.
In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals affirmed dismissal of the constructive discharge claim
and the claim regarding paid administrative leave.
App. 53-56. Like the district court, the court of appeals
rejected the constructive discharge claim only on the
ground that the conditions which Fuller faced at work
were not so severe that a reasonable person would
3s Doc. 39-1, pp. 15-16.
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have felt compelled to resign. App. 55. The court of appeals did not have occasion to decide whether any of
those conditions were the result of gender bias. The appellate court rejected the claim regarding the denial of
paid administrative leave on the ground that there was
insufficient evidence to prove that denial was the result of discrimination. Id.
In a separate published opinion, the court of appeals reversed the dismissal of Fuller’s hostile work
environment claim. Addressing the specific grounds on
which summary judgment had been sought and
granted, the court of appeals concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the working conditions which
Fuller faced created a hostile work environment, a less
demanding standard than that governing constructive
discharge claims. App. 11-22.
A reasonable woman in Fuller’s circumstances could perceive the repeated statements of concern for Cruz’s well-being by
supervisors as evincing their belief that
Fuller was lying or, perhaps worse, as valuing
Cruz’s reputation and job over her safety. This
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Harvey and Atencio held important supervisory
positions.
App. 14. The court noted that the defendants’ actions
could have led a reasonable woman in Fuller’s position
to fear for her safety. "As far as Fuller knew, Cruz
might return to work any day." App. 13. "The repeated
endorsement of Cruz ... [and] It]he decision to publicly
support an employee accused of raping another
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employee was ’humiliating’ and potentially ’physically
threatening’ to Fuller...." App. 14. "[T]he IDOC’s decision to support Cruz, both publically and internally, after Fuller reported that he raped her, contributed to a
hostile work environment." App. 17 n.ll. "Because
Fuller learned after she was raped that IDOC was
aware of Cruz’s ’history of this kind of behavior,’ she
reasonably could have believed that the IDOC would
continue to support Cruz at the expense of its female
employees." App. 13 n.8. "Other evidence .... support[ing] the conclusion that a reasonable woman
could perceive a hostile work environment at the IDOC
... [included] Fuller[’s] ... co-workers’ hostility toward
her for missing work, [because of] Harvey’s e-mail,
which failed to divulge why Cruz was on leave." App.
15.
The defendants, in both the district court and
court of appeals, had challenged this hostile work environment claim only on the ground that the actions
complained of had not created a hostile environment.
However, in the court of appeals a dissenting opinion
for the first time raised a new issue, arguing that there
was insufficient evidence that those actions were discriminatory. App. 43-51. After noting that the defendants had failed to raise or preserve that issue (App. 22),
the majority concluded that a reasonable jury could
find that the defendants had acted on the basis of gender. App. 22-26.
One member of the court of appeals dissented.
She contended both that the actions of the defendants
were insufficient to create a hostile environment (App.
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51-52), and that there was insufficient evidence that
those actions were gender-based. App. 43-51.
Defendants sought panel rehearing and rehearing
en banc, arguing that the working conditions created
by their actions did not constitute a hostile work environment. The petition did not challenge the majority’s
conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the actions of the defendants that
created the hostile environment were the result of gender discrimination. The petition was denied. App. 89.
Fuller filed a motion for clarification, seeking to resolve uncertainty as to how (or whether) the court of
appeals had resolved her Equal Protection-based hostile environment claim. That motion was denied.

GROUNDS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
Throughout the litigation in the courts below, petitioner challenged Fuller’s hostile work environment
claim on one ground only. It argued in the district court
and court of appeals that a reasonable jury could not
conclude that the actions of the IDOC supervisors had
created a hostile work environment. The court of appeals rejected that contention; petitioner39 does not
seek review of that aspect of the decision below.
Rather, petitioner in this Court for the first time
argues that, even if a hostile work environment did
39 Atencio, who was sued in his personal capacity, has not
joined the petition.
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exist, there is insufficient record evidence to permit a
reasonable jury to conclude that the actions of the
IDOC supervisors that created that hostile environment were gender-based. That quite distinct issue was
raised below only by the dissenting opinion in the court
of appeals, several years after petitioner first filed its
motion for summary judgment in the district court. Because petitioner never sought summary judgment on
this ground, it was never addressed in the briefs filed
in the lower courts; the first brief filed by petitioner
discussing that issue was the petition for writ of certiorari in this Court. This issue was not preserved, or
vetted, in the courts below, and it raises only a dispute
about whether the lower court misapplied a correctly
stated rule of law.
I.

There Is No Circuit Conflict Regarding
Whether The Conduct Creating A Hostile
Work Environment Must Be Discriminatory

The gravamen of the petition is petitioner’s assertion that "[i]n its published opinion, the panel removed
the ’because of sex’ requirement." Pet. 26. To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit’s published opinion spells out
that very requirement. "A Title VII plaintiff must
prove discrimination ’because of ... sex.’ 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1)." App. 22.
The court of appeals carefully applied that correctly stated requirement to the record in this case. A
specific section of the published opinion is expressly
devoted to an analysis of whether the record evidence
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was sufficient to permit a trier of fact to conclude the
actions of the IDOC officials were the result of unlawful discrimination. App. 22-26.
[A] jury armed with "[c]ommon sense, and an
appropriate sensitivity to social context" could
reasonably conclude that the actions of
Fuller’s supervisor - siding with Cruz, her alleged rapist, over her - were because of her
sex .... It is up to a jury, not us, to decide
whether that inference is the best one to draw
from this record.
App. 26 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82).
[A]n inference of discrimination because of
sex is [especially] reasonable where, as here,
the record ... contains evidence of Fuller’s
male supervisor’s solicitous treatment of the
man whom they knew may have raped Fuller
and their less solicitous treatment of the
woman who reported the rape.
App. 25 (emphasis in original).
To the extent that the dissent argues that the
record does not permit the inference that the
IDOC’s treatment of Fuller would have been
any better had Fuller been a man, or that any
such inference would be based on "overbroad
generalizations" based on gender, ... it ignores
reality.
App. 25 (quoting dissent, App. 50 n.20).
That the dissent can point to some irrelevant
evidence as "undisputed" does not deem the
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inference from other evidence that Fuller was
discriminated against because of her sex to be
not "rational or reasonable."
App. 21-22.
The requirement of unlawful discrimination in
harassment cases, reiterated and applied by the court
of appeals in the instant case, is consistent with decades of Ninth Circuit precedent. An appendix to this
brief contains quotations from 42 Ninth Circuit decisions setting out that clearly established standard. Br.
Opp. App. la-9a; see, e.g., Davis v. Team Electric Co.,
520 F.3d 1080, 1095 (9th Cir. 2008) ("To survive summary judgment on her claim that [the defendant]
failed to prevent the creation of [a hostile work] environment, ... It]he conduct must constitute discrimination because of sex."); Dominguez v. Nevada Dept. of
Transp., 424 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 871
(9th Cir. 2001)) ("To prevail on a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim, the plaintiff must ...
prove that ’any harassment took place "because of
sex."’"); Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.,
256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Oncale, 523
U.S. at 79) ("Sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII to the extent it occurs ’because of’ the plaintiff’s
sex.").

The Ninth Circuit has not hesitated to uphold the
dismissal of gender-based harassment claims where a
plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence to permit
a trier of fact to conclude that the conduct that gave
rise to the hostile environment at issue was the result
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of gender discrimination. See, e.g., Yee v. Solis, 472
Fed.Appx. 471, 472 (9th Cir. 2012) ("The district court
properly granted summary judgment on Yee’s harassment claim because Yee failed to raise a triable dispute
as to whether the alleged harassing conduct was because of her ... sex .... "); Spates-Moore v. Donahoe, 470
Fed.Appx. 696, 696 (9th Cir. 2012) ("The district court
properly granted summary judgment on SpatesMoore’s claim of harassment ..., because Spates-Moore
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether the alleged conduct was because of her
sex .... "); Strong v. Witter, 452 Fed.Appx. 801, 802-03
(9th Cir. 2011) ("The district court properly granted
summary judgment on Strong’s sexual harassment
claim because Strong failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether the alleged conduct was
because of his sex .... "); cf. EEOC v. Boeing Co., 317
Fed.Appx. 608,609 (9th Cir. 2008) (summary judgment
improper because "a reasonable jury could infer that
Miles was subjected to conduct by her male co-workers
that was both objectively and subjectively offensive
and that Miles was so targeted because of her gender").
The petition contains a series of bald assertions,
unaccompanied by any citation to the opinion below,
that the Ninth Circuit in this case abolished the requirement of proof that the conduct giving rise to a
hostile environment must be the result of discrimination.4° Petitioner does not quote a single passage from
4o E.g., Pet. 6 ("The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case eliminates the requirement that the discrimination be ’based on sex[ ]’
.... "), 15 ("The Ninth Circuit decision removes the requirement of
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the majority opinion that adopts a legal standard dispensing with that requirement.
In those instances in which the petition does cite
a page of the opinion, the actual text of the opinion be-.
lies petitioner’s characterization. For example, the pe-~
tition makes the following assertion:
To support its ruling, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly held that the only issue to be considered
was "whether an objective, reasonable woman
would find her work environment had been altered because the employer condoned the rape
and its effects." .... App. 12.
Pet. 17 (emphasis added). But the critical word "only"
does not appear in the quoted passage. The language
at issue is part of the appeals court’s discussion of what
would constitute a hostile work environment. App. 1117. The immediately preceding sentence makes clear
that the court is addressing only Fuller’s assertion that
the IDOC’s actions created a hostile work environment. App. 12. Nothing on the page of the opinion cited
by petitioner suggests that it is a sufficient condition.
Motive is not mentioned on that page of the opinion
simply because the issue of motive is discussed in a
separate part of the opinion. See App. 22-26.

gender based discrimination or that sexual harassment create ’an
abusive working environment.’ ") (quoting Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998)), 19.
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The petition claims that
[u]nder the Ninth Circuit’s published opinion,
an investigation of employee conduct which,
standing alone does not violate Title VII,
could become an actionable hostile work environment if the complaining employee felt that
his or her supervisors did not sufficiently
champion their complaints prior to completing the investigation to determine whether
workplace harassment had occurred ....App.
12.
Pet. 16 (emphasis added). The qualification "could" not "would"- reveals the problem with this argument.
Petitioner is not actually asserting that under the
Ninth Circuit opinion a plaintiff’s perception that
there was a hostile environment would by itself create
an actionable environment, but only that such a perception could be relevant. It is indeed relevant, because
a plaintiff mu~t show, inter alia, that she actually perceived the environment as hostile (the subjective element). But to assert that such a perception could
support one element of an actionable hostile work environment is not the same as asserting that such evidence alone would be sufficient to demonstrate all the
elements of a claim. The majority opinion discusses
separately the additional need for proof that the hostile environment was created by discriminatory conduct. App. 22-26.
The petition asserts, without citing any portion of
the opinion, that
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[a]pplying the logic expressed in the Ninth
Circuit’s published opinion, the fact the complaining employee may believe their employer’s decision expresses support for the
individual they [sic] accused of harassment
would, standing alone, support a Title VII
claim.
Pet. 19 (emphasis added). The problem with this state.ment is the ambiguous term "support."A plaintiffmust
subjectively believe that the employer’s actions have
created a hostile environment; a rape victim’s percep-.
tion that her employer was expressing support for the
rapist might well lead her to subjectively perceive the
environment as hostile. But if, by the term "support,’’
petitioner is asserting that under the "logic expressed
in the Ninth Circuit’s published opinion" such subjective perception would be legally sufficient to establish
an unlawful hostile work environment claim, that
characterization of the opinion below is manifestly incorrect. The majority clearly also requires a plaintiff to
establish that the environment was objectively hostile
(App. 12), and that the conduct creating that hostile
environment was the result of a discriminatory conduct. App. 22-26.
Elsewhere the petition claims that
[i]n its published opinion, the panel removed
the "because of sex" requirement, ruling a hoso
tile work environment could arise through the
actions of Fuller’s supervisors during the
IDOC’s investigation of the rape allegations
that it had already determined [in its
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unpublished opinion] did not violate the Act ....
App. 18.
Pet. 16. This assertion embodies four distinct flaws.
First, although the unpublished opinion rejected
Fuller’s claim that the failure to notify the IDOC staff
about the protective order resulted in a constructive
discharge, it did so only on the ground that the resulting level of danger was not "so intolerable that a reasonable person in [Fuller’s] position would have felt
compelled to resign." (App. 55) (quoting Poland v.
Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007)). That did
not mean that the danger was irrelevant to a hostile
work environment claim; a constructive discharge
claim requires working conditions significantly more
onerous than a hostile environment claim.41 Second,
the action which the unpublished opinion held was not
the result of gender bias was the decision to deny
Fuller paid administrative leave (App. 55), which ultimately led her to return to work. But the published
opinion concerns the conditions on the job to which
Fuller reluctantly returned, not why she did so. Third,
the bulk of the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the conduet creating the hostile work environment concerns
actions which the petition simply never mentions. See
App. 12-17. Fourth, the portion of the Ninth Circuit
opinion cited by petitioner (App. 18) has nothing to do
with any of this; it concerns, rather, whether IDOC was

41 Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 131
(2004); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir.
2000); Wade v. Solis, 402 Fed.Appx. 288, 289 (9th Cir. 2010).
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liable for the actions of Fuller’s supervisors. App. 18
and n. 12.
Finally, in a passage quoting the dissenting opinion below, petitioner asserts that "[t]he majority ... effectively holds that an employer can be found liable
even in the absence of evidence the workplace conduct
at issue constitutes ’discriminat[ion] ... because of ...
sex.’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)." Pet. 16 (quoting App.
39; emphasis added). "Effectively holds" is simply a
rhetorical flourish sometimes found in a dissenting
opinion which recognizes that the majority has announced the correct legal standard, but contends that
that standard has been misapplied to the case at hand.
Such a misapplication, even if it had occurred, would
not warrant review by this Court.
II. Certiorari Should Not Be Granted To Address
A Dispute About The Sufficiency Of The Evidence Of Discrimination
The gravamen of the dissenting opinion is that the
majority incorrectly assessed the probativeness of the
evidence of gender-based discrimination. See App. 43
("Contrary to the majority, I would hold that Fuller has
not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding
[whether] ... any conduct in the workplace was ’because
of ... sex.’") (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)), 44 n.17
("The ... circumstances cited by the majority likewise
do not support any inference of’discriminat[ion] ... because of .o. sex.’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)."), 29 ("[T]he
majority ... mistakes unreasonable inference for reasonable ones .... "). Such a fact-bound dispute about
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evidence sufficiency does not warrant review by this
Court.
Review of that issue would be particularly inappropriate in this case because the issue was not raised
or preserved by petitioner in the courts below. The
panel noted that "[t]he dissent ... contends that Fuller
presented no evidence that she was discriminated
against ’because of’ her sex ....IT]hat argument [is one
which] IDOC did not raise ...."App. 22. The dissenting
opinion below did not disagree that the defendants had
never raised this issue. Their failure to do so is for several reasons fatal to the petition. First, because the defendants failed to raise this as a ground for their
original summary judgment motion, the district court
itself was precluded from granting relief on that basis
without first ordering separate briefing on the issue.
Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable time
to respond, the court may o.. (2) grant the motion on
grounds not raised by a party...." The manifest purpose
of this Rule is to give the non-moving party notice of
the specific ground of a motion, so that it knows what
type of evidence should be adduced. In this case the
only ground on which summary judgment was sought
regarding the hostile work environment claim was
that the work environment Fuller faced was not sufficiently adverse to constitute a hostile environment.
The district court could not have addressed the discriminatory-basis issue, raised by the IDOC only in its
petition in this Court, without first directing the defendants to file a new motion on that distinct ground.
Equally importantly, because the defendants did not
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attempt to raise the discrimination issue even in the
court of appeals, none of the fact-specific objections
raised in the dissent, and responded to in the majority
opinion below, were ever briefed by the parties in that
court (as they were not in the district court). In the
court of appeals, the majority opinion and dissent below disagreed about the factual record; but the parties,
who would necessarily have a far better understanding
of the record, were never involved. If review were
granted, this Court would be the first forum in which
the parties themselves would address these factual issues.

The court of appeals correctly concluded that there
was ample evidence to permit a trier of fact to conclude
that the official conduct that created the hostile environment in this case was the result of gender bias. A
reasonable jury could assuredly infer that gender bias
was behind the favorable and supportive statements
made about Cruz by IDOC officials who knew that
there were credible accounts that he had raped two
women, and who knew that Cruz had a history of abusing women. "One day after Fuller reported the rape, a
supervisor told her that the rapist ’had a history of this
kind of behavior.’ Nonetheless, the supervisor sent an
e-mail to all agency employees the very next day, telling them to ’feel free’ to contact the rapist and ’give
him some encouragement.’" App. 2. "A[] reasonable inference of discrimination because of sex surely.., arises
when an employer, knowing that a female employee
was sexually assaulted by a male coworker, nonetheless tells its employees that it looks forward to the rapist’s return to work and encourages them to contact
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him with messages of support." App. 25 n.13. A reasonable trier of fact might well conclude that IDOC officials would not have said such things if there were two
eye witnesses accusing Cruz of robbing a bank, or of
burning down the governor’s mansion, rather than accusing him of rape, a gender-based act.
The whole pattern of behavior of IDOC officials, a
jury could infer, reflected a view that when a man is
charged with sexually abusing a woman (or two), protecting the man’s reputation and career are more important than protecting thewomen from physical
harm. A reasonable jury, like a reasonable woman in
Fuller’s position, "could perceive the repeated statements of concern for Cruz’s well-being by supervisors
as ... valuing Cruz’s reputation and job over her safety."
App. 14. When Fuller told Atencio that she was afraid
that Cruz might just walk into the building without
anyone calling the police, Atencio dismissed that concern as just Fuller’s subjective perception that Cruz’s
possible presence would be "distasteful," ignoring the
clear basis she had for believing she would be in physical danger. App. 8. "[T]he severity of the sexual assaults on Fuller [were] documented by photographs
seen by the IDOC supervisors .... " App. 14. At the November 10 meeting, when Fuller sought protection
from a man whom a state judge necessarily had concluded posed "an immediate and present danger of ...
violence," Harvey and Atencio were preoccupied instead with preserving Cruz’s reputation. The IDOC supervisors bent over backwards to protect Cruz’s
reputation from the truth - that a judge had issued a
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civil protection order, and that two women had accused
him of rape - even if it meant permitting the evisceration of Fuller’s own reputation that had been caused
by the supervisors’ own misrepresentations, and by
their insistence that Fuller not disclose to the staff
what was actually going on. A reasonable jury could
infer that, if this situation had not involved sexual
abuse, the supervisors would have thought that revealing the truth was more important than perpetuating a
lie.
In evaluating the motive behind the IDOC’s actions, a jury could consider evidence that in the past
agency supervisors had turned a blind eye to sexual
misconduct by Cruz.
The IDOC’s knowledge of previous sexual harassment complaints against Cruz ... "is relevant and probative of [the IDOC’s] general
attitude of disrespect toward [its] female employees." .... Because Fuller learned after she
was raped that the IDOC was aware of Cruz’s
"history of this kind of behavior," she reasonably could have believed that the IDOC would
continue to support Cruz at the expense of its
female employees.
App. 13 n.8 (quoting Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475,
1479-81 (9th Cir. 1995)). The opinion below presents a
fact-bound dispute between the majority and dissent
about the manner in which IDOC had dealt in the past
with harassment by Cruz. Compare App. 19-20 with
App. 31-33. The dissent asserts Harvey told Fuller
merely that there had been "complaints more than
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once before [against Cruz]." App. 31 (emphasis added).
On the other hand, Fuller testified that what Harvey
said was that Cruz had an actual "history of this kind
of behavior." App. 2 (emphasis added). The dissent
thought it exculpatory that an earlier lawsuit about
Cruz’s behavior "was resolved by final judgment in
IDOC’s favor." App. 31-32. But the decision in that earlier case dismissed the claim as untimely, not on the
merits. Martin v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 2007 WL
1667597 at *2-*3 (D. Idaho June 7, 2007). These highly
fact-specific differences are clearly matters to be resolved at trial.
One statement, made at the critical November 10
meeting and not objected to by any of the other supervisors present, is particularly telling. Responding to
Fuller’s objection to his August remark expressing the
hope that Cruz would return quickly, and that the matter would be "cleared up," Harvey explained that when
he said those things only a single woman had so far
accused Cruz of rape. App. 7. That remark, whose occurrence is not disputed,42 encapsulates in a single sentence the most fundamental and insidious biases about
rape and domestic violence - that women are not to be
believed when they report such attacks, and that the
crimes themselves are not to be taken seriously. A reasonable jury could assuredly conclude that Harvey
meant exactly what he said, that Atencio thought this
explanation made complete sense, and that their palpable indifference to the most extreme form of sexual
The statement was recorded at the time. App. 36.
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and domestic abuse explained their entire course of
conduct.
Petitioner does not dispute the probativeness of
this array of evidence of gender bias, or even mention
it. Instead, petitioner argues that a plaintiff contending that she was discriminated against on the basis of
sex must prove that the employer treated more favorably a similarly situated male worker. Pet. 18-19. In
this case, that would have required Fuller to prove that
IDOC had a male worker who alleged he had been repeatedly raped by a female employee, herself already
under investigation for raping yet another man, and
that the IDOC had treated that male employee victim
better than it treated Fuller. But Fuller was not limited to proving the basis of the defendants’ actions by
producing evidence regarding the treatment of such a
male IDOC employee, whose existence is virtually unimaginable. A plaintiff may use any"evidentiary route"
to establish that a defendant’s actions were discriminatory. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. In the alternative, petitioner suggests that the type of gender bias identified
by the court below simply is not forbidden by Title VII.
On petitioner’s view, the only invidious gender discrimination forbidden by Title VII are acts motivated by
sexual desire or by a general animus towards all
women. Pet. 20. But Title VII "’strike[s] at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in
employment." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
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